Cross-Cutting Concerns: The Varying Effects of Partisan Cues in the Context of Social Networks by Smith, Benjamin King
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
Summer 8-14-2014
Cross-Cutting Concerns: The Varying Effects of Partisan Cues in
the Context of Social Networks
Benjamin King Smith
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Social Influence and Political Communication
Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Smith, Benjamin King, "Cross-Cutting Concerns: The Varying Effects of Partisan Cues in the Context of Social Networks" (2014).
Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1952.
10.15760/etd.1951
Cross-Cutting Concerns:  

















A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 



























© 2014 Benjamin K. Smith 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 




The theory of motivated reasoning predicts that partisan cues in the media will affect 
political attitudes, by encouraging individuals to align their views with those of their 
party’s elites. The effect has primarily been tested by looking at issues that have pre-
established partisan positions (e.g. immigration reform, gay rights, etc.). This study looks 
at the effects of partisan cues in the media on attitudes toward a non-partisan issue, the 
NSA’s collection of Americans’ meta-data. Additionally, the study extends research on 
partisan cues by exploring the moderating role of an individual’s political communication 
network and, specifically, exposure to cross-cutting political communication. Findings 
are mixed: although there was no main effect of exposure to partisan cues in general, 
strong partisans were more affected by exposure to partisan cues than weak partisans 
were. Additionally, although frequency of political discussion was not found to moderate 
the effect of partisan cues, individuals with high exposure to cross-cutting 
communication were significantly less affected by partisan cues than those with low 
exposure to cross-cutting communication. Limitations, implications and future directions 
are discussed. 
 Keywords: partisan cues, cross-cutting communication, inter-personal 
communication, motivated reasoning, communication networks  
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This study evaluates the effect of partisan cues on political attitudes and, 
specifically, the role of interpersonal communication networks as moderators of partisan 
cue effects. Building upon the work of Lazarsfeld and others (Hwang, 2012; Kimsey & 
Atwood, 1979; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948), this study updates research on 
individuals’ social networks as moderators of the effect of media upon political attitudes 
and decisions in the presence of partisan cues. Political science research into partisan cue 
moderators primarily focus on individual level factors, such as partisan affiliation and 
motivated reasoning. Research looking specifically at conversation networks in a political 
context primarily look at their effects on political participation, not on their role in 
shaping attitudes. This work bridges the divide. 
If the role of political communication research is to assist in the promotion of 
“civic competence and coherent voting behavior” (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 
2013, p. 75), then it is important to more fully understand the power that party loyalty has 
to trump logic and argument strength when making political decisions (Druckman, Fein, 
& Leeper, 2012; Jochim & Jones, 2013). To that end, this study utilizes an experimental 
approach to examine the effect of partisan cues embedded in messages about the NSA 
surveillance program on support for such surveillance as well as the possible moderators 
– including partisan strength, frequency of political discussion and exposure to cross-
cutting communication – of this effect. 
  
2 
Review of Literature 
A primary emphasis of political communication research in America is the role of 
parties in shaping attitudes and voter preferences. Over the last fifty years, researchers 
have examined how political parties shape individuals attitudes and how the media helps 
to promote this influence. Of course, any discussion of the American voter must begin 
with the seminal book of the same name: The American Voter. Using a set of American 
National Election Studies panel surveys investigating candidate preferences during and 
after the 1958 presidential election, the authors concluded that party is the single 
strongest indicator of voting behavior. Put another way, the stronger an individual’s 
affiliation toward a political party, the more likely her attitudes and evaluations align 
strongly with her espoused party (A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960).  
Campbell et al.’s research is the foundation for over a half century’s worth of 
political science research into the psyche of the American voter and the role of partisan 
affiliation as a heuristic, or mental short-cut (Popkin, 1991). While many Americans are 
not eager to seek out information about the relevant issue stances of different candidates, 
they are “capable of picking up cheap cues, or heuristics” (Schaffner & Streb, 2002, p. 
560) which allow them to accurately predict those stances based on things like candidate 
occupation (McDermott, 2005), gender (McDermott, 1997), religion (D. E. Campbell, 
Green, & Layman, 2011), race (Banducci, Karp, Thrasher, & Rallings, 2008), and 
especially party identification (Popkin, 1991). Knowing a small piece of information 
about a candidate, like their political affiliation, helps the otherwise uniformed voter 
make a prediction about whether a candidate shares his ideals or not. 
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Motivated Reasoning 
The party affiliation heuristic is useful for voters because it limits the resources 
required to make a ballot box decision consistent with their own values and interests. 
Similarly, partisan affiliation can help voters make decisions about controversial political 
issues. Partisan cues in mediated messages can prompt individuals to take the stance 
attributed to their party, even if this requires an attitudinal change (Dancey & Goren, 
2010; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009). In one case, researchers found that using 
partisan cues while asking individuals about their political values increased party-value 
alignment anywhere between 13% and 17%, depending upon the value under 
consideration (Goren et al., 2009). Partisan cues exacerbated the gulf between Republican 
and Democratic values in their study. 
The established framework for understanding how this works – how partisan 
affiliation drives attitude formation – is the theory of motivated reasoning1 (or TMR; 
Kim, 2010). Based on research into cognitive dissonance (i.e., the feeling of discomfort 
associated with holding two or more conflicting cognitions; Festinger, 1957), the TMR 
states that individuals are motivated to produce emotionally preferable conclusions when 
presented with new information (Kunda, 1990).  
When analyzing two dissonant pieces of information, individuals will take the 
path of least resistance toward a cognitive equilibrium. This equilibrium must 
“simultaneously satisfy two sets of constraints: cognitive constraints, which maximize 
goodness of fit to the data, and emotional constraints, which maximize positive affect 
1 Alternatively known as motivated skepticism (Taber & Lodge, 2006) 
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and minimize negative affect” (Emphasis in original, Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & 
Hamann, 2006, p. 1947).  
In the context of attitude formation, established cognitive constraints include prior 
knowledge (including prior knowledge about the stances of differing parties), prior 
beliefs, and feelings of self-efficacy (Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2011). These 
cognitive constraints will guide the assimilation of new knowledge and beliefs, as long as 
the situation is emotionally neutral. However, the greater the negative affect of the 
information, the greater the likelihood that the individual will reject it as false. This 
tendency towards rejection is known as a disconfirmation bias (Taber & Lodge, 2006). In 
a corollary, the more positive the affect, the less time and cognitive resources will be 
used to process the information, resulting in a prior attitude effect wherein individuals 
“view evidence consistent with prior opinions as stronger or more effective” (Druckman 
et al., 2013, p. 59). The tendency to maximize positive affect also drives individuals to 
selectively expose themselves to, or seek out, information that confirms their prior 
beliefs, in an effect known as confirmation bias (Stroud, 2008). 
If an individual does not have an emotional response to the information he is 
processing, and he has the ability and motivation to systematically process said 
information, he will likely accept or reject the information based upon its perceived 
validity. However, if an emotional response is triggered, then the individual is likely to 
“demonstrate biased processing by (1) taking consonant information (that which falls in a 
narrow range of acceptance) as simply veridical, and embracing it, but (2) judging 
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counterattitudinal information to be the product of a biased, misguided, or ill-informed 
source, and rejecting it” (Gunther, 1992, p. 151). 
This model suggests that an individual’s ideological affiliation is likely to trump 
prior attitudes, in the presence of partisan cues, due to the emotional difficulty associated 
with breaking party lines (Westen et al., 2006). This is supported by Dancey and Goren 
(2010), who used longitudinal survey data to show that individuals out of step with their 
party on health care reform and affirmative action tended to alter their attitudes to more 
accurately match those of their party when coverage of elite partisan debate in the media 
was high. The opposite effect – changing party preference to match attitude – was much 
less likely to occur.  
It should be noted that this relationship is moderated by both the strength of party 
affiliation and the perceived quality of the information being processed (Redlawsk, 
Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010).  Jones explains that: “people identify emotionally with 
[what] they have encoded in memory. They become attached emotionally to their current 
repertoire of encoded solutions, even as the problems they face evolve” (2003, p. 400). 
As such, when they are confronted with the need to change their preferred solution (i.e. 
party choice), there is a strong negative affect, equivalent to the strength of their 
attachment, that can only be overcome by a preponderance of inarguable evidence (Appel 
& Richter, 2010; Redlawsk et al., 2010). 
The Role of Interpersonal Communication Networks 
Taken in sum, evidence for the theory of motivated reasoning suggests that it is a 
strong model of the cognitive level influences on attitude formation and, in turn, on 
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voting behaviors. However, the model can be expanded to take into account the context 
in which these attitudes are formed and wherein these behaviors happen.  
One of the more important contextual factors playing a role in attitude formation 
is discussion. Lazarsfeld and his co-authors were among the first scholars to look at 
communication networks as a mediator of media effects (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), and 
through analyses of the 1940 presidential election, they were able to identify a path for 
the influence of mass media that they referred to as the two-step flow of communication. 
This model posits that mass media does not directly influence everyone in the general 
public but, instead, that the media has a direct effect on issue specific opinion leaders 
who then influence the general public.  
While the original two-step flow of communication did not pick up as much 
traction among political scientists as it did elsewhere, “mainly for lack of empirical 
support (see, e.g., Bennett & Manheim, 2006)” (Mutz & Young, 2011, p. 1038), the last 
thirty years saw “a resurgence of interest in the power of social networks as conveyors of 
both influence and information that undergirds public opinion” (Mutz & Young, 2011, p. 
1036). A relevant area of current research focuses on two ways that political conversation 
networks may moderate media effects: 1) by altering memory, and/or 2) altering behavior 
(Southwell & Yzer, 2008). 
Interpersonal conversation networks and memory. The first way that 
conversation networks might moderate media effects is by altering the storage and 
retrieval of information. According to Southwell & Yzer, “A growing literature on the 
relationships between conversation and memory (e.g., Dickinson & Givón, 1997; 
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Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Southwell, 2005) suggests that people do not accept and 
store information directly from media outlets and then simply retrieve that information 
later in unmitigated fashion” (2008, p. 444). This is primarily due to inefficiencies in the 
functioning of our memories. Rather than retrieving only the most relevant information 
when presented with a stimulus, a large range of related thoughts are triggered. This is 
why, when presented with a partisan cue, there can be an affective response to the primed 
party, even if the evaluation being made depends on a primarily cognitive process. The 
partisan cue activates prior knowledge, policy positions, associations and feelings. This 
information helps guide the processes described in detail above.  
The strengths of these cognitive connections and the ease of their retrieval are in 
part a factor of conversation. Looking at the 2000 Minnesota Senate campaign, 
Druckman (2004) used a logistic regression analysis to predict candidate vote choice. 
Within the model, a voter’s level of discussion about the campaign did not predict for 
whom they voted. Similarly, neither campaign attentiveness nor issue priming 
significantly predicted candidate preference. However, when levels of issue priming, 
campaign attentiveness and campaign discussion were factored together, they predicted 
vote choice more than any other factor. The ability of a candidate to cue certain issues 
within a voter’s cognition depended largely upon the amount of conversation the voter 
had about the campaign. This would imply that the more political discussion an 
individual has, the more likely she is to be affected by priming, a corollary of partisan 
cues. 
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Interpersonal conversation networks and behavior. In addition to altering 
memory retrieval and storage, it is possible that conversation moderates the relationship 
between media messages and behavior. In 2002, Scheufele proposed the differential 
gains hypothesis, which posits that the influence of media is at least partly a function of 
the extent to which individuals regularly participate in interpersonal communication. This 
hypothesis’s premise is that different people have different needs and uses for hard news. 
As such, there should be an interaction effect between specific needs (like political 
discussion), and news exposure. 
In applying this hypothesis, Scheufele found that the interaction between political 
discussion frequency and hard news media use (specifically newspaper readership) 
significantly predicted political participation. Subsequently, it has been found that 
individuals who have conversations about a political topic, or expect to have 
conversations about a political topic, are more likely to engage in “mediated information-
seeking behavior to gather information for use in those discussions” (Eveland & Cooper, 
2013, p. 14092).  
One implication of the differential gains hypothesis – that political discussion 
alters the relationship between media use and political behavior – is that a higher 
frequency of political discussion within ones social network should strengthen the effect 
of partisan cues in mediated messages. Specifically, “for those individuals who anticipate 
talking to others about political information garnered from mass media, there should be a 
cognitive tuning effect prior to their discussions (e.g., Cloven & Roloff, 1995)” 
(Scheufele, 2002, p. 51). This cognitive tuning effect should increase the attention given 
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to the media being read, and in turn should increase the likelihood of noticing and being 
affected by priming cues, like partisan cues.  
Cross-Cutting Conversation Networks 
The hypothesized roles of conversation networks in moderating information 
retrieval/storage and moderating political behavior indicate that the more individuals talk 
about politics, the more likely they are to be influenced by embedded partisan cues. In 
other words, increased political discussion frequency should facilitate the possibility that 
partisan affiliation will trump prior beliefs in the presence of partisan cues. However, this 
assumes that all conversation is equal.  
Where Scheufele found that amount of interpersonal communication was 
associated with levels of participation, Mutz’s study of cross-cutting conversation 
(defined as conversations with non-like-minded others) demonstrates that the kind of 
communication matters (Mutz, 2002a, 2002b). Using a nationally representative sample, 
Mutz had respondents answer a battery of questions about the kinds of political 
discussions they have. In line with prior research, she found that discussion network size 
and frequency of political talk were positively associated with participation in the 1992 
presidential election (b = .37 and b = .14 respectively; see: Mutz, 2002b, p. 844). 
However, she also found that exposure to cross-cutting conversation – the frequency of 
political conversation with individuals who hold opposing viewpoints, regardless of party 
affiliation (Mutz, 2006) – was negatively correlated with participation (b = -.21; Mutz, 
2002b, p. 944).  
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In a similar study, Mutz found that possession of a larger cross-cutting political 
conversation network was also associated with increased political tolerance, as mediated 
by awareness of rationales for oppositional views (Mutz, 2002a). Mutz suggested that the 
reason these effects occur is that individuals with large cross-cutting networks are forced 
to consistently deliberate upon their own issue positions, which in turn increases the 
emotional discomfort they experience in relation to these issues.  
As Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson (2010) pointed out, it is illogical to expect 
individuals to maintain and support their existing political evaluations ad infinitum in the 
presence of extensive disconfirming, and emotionally discomforting, information. They, 
along with others (e.g. Dancey & Goren, 2010), empirically showed that as exposure to 
dissonant information increases, the likelihood that an individual will alter his or her 
beliefs and/or political associations to align with the disconfirming information also 
increases. This is perfectly in-line with the theory of motivated reasoning, as outlined 
above, and indicates that participation in cross-cutting communication should result in 
weaker attitudes. While this research does not specifically deal with the role of cross-
cutting communication as a moderator of partisan effects, perhaps the interaction between 
media exposure and dissonant communication will moderate partisan effects contrary to 
the effect of general communication. In other words, where ‘normal’ political 
conversation supports the effect of partisan cues in mediated messages, perhaps cross-
cutting conversation will limit the effect.  
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The Current Study 
This research project evaluates the effect of partisan cues in the context of an 
ideologically disputed policy. In the summer of 2013, former National Security Agency 
(NSA) contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the agency collects meta-data on almost 
all American telecommunications as part of ongoing counter-terrorist activities (Poitras, 
Rosenbach, & Stark, 2013). This created a relatively large uproar domestically with 
opponents arguing the activity was a violation of personal privacy and the 4th 
Amendment’s protection against unlawful search. Proponents argued that the program 
was a necessary anti-terrorism tool, responsible for preventing the deaths of American 
citizens at home and abroad.  
In response to the ensuing controversy over this program, Harry Reid, John 
Boehner and other party leaders voiced strong support for continuing the NSA 
surveillance program without meaningful alteration. In contrast, a group of 
Representatives in the House, equally split between Republicans and Democrats, nearly 
crippled the program by voting in support of a bill requiring individual warrants for each 
piece of information gathered (Weaver, 2013). According to the Pew Research Center’s 
polling undertaken between the summer of 2013 and the early spring of 2014, the general 
American public has shared Congress’s bi-partisan resistance/support for this 
controversial issue. Levels of support for and against the NSA’s actions are evenly split 
across the two parties (Pew Research Center, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014).  
The context for this study is a (manufactured) news article describing a proposed 
Senate bill partially reducing the ability of the Federal government to collect meta-data. 
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Participants are alternatively shown a version of the article in which Republicans are 
proposing the bill, Democrats are proposing the bill or where neither party is referenced. 
Causal tests on the effect of partisan cues generally look at issues with pre-established 
partisan and ideological associations, and not on non-partisan issues. The NSA 
surveillance issue presents an opportunity to do just that. 
The theory of partisan motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge, 2006) suggests that 
partisan cues in the media help individuals remain consonant with the positions taken by 
their party’s elites. This is in part driven by a desire to avoid the emotional difficulty 
associated with cognitive dissonance (Westen et al., 2006). As such: 
H1a: Individuals shown a partisan cue will report attitudes that align more 
closely with the position attributed to their party than those not shown a 
partisan cue. 
H1b: This effect will be greater for those seeing a dissonant cue than for those 
shown a consonant cue. 
H1c: Partisan cue effects will be greater for strong partisans than for weak 
partisans. 
The differential gains hypothesis implies that individuals who regularly engage in 
political discussion are more affected by mediated messages than those who do not 
(Scheufele, 2002), and as such are more likely to be affected by a priming cue. 
Conversely, research into cross-cutting conversation exposure suggests that high 
exposure to dissonant conversation may result in a decreased effect from priming cues 
(Mutz, 2002a, 2002b). This leads to the following predictions:  
H2:  Partisan cue effects will be greater for those with a higher frequency of 
political discussion than for those with a lower frequency of political 
discussion. 
H3:  Partisan cue effects will be smaller for those with more exposure to cross-




Participants and Procedures 
This study uses a convenience sample of Americans, over the age of 18, recruited 
from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk - an online platform for paying subjects to perform 
varying types of tasks. While not a population-based probability sample, it is more 
representative of a sample than the typical in-person convenience sample used by most 
researchers (Mason & Suri, 2012). Respondents who fully completed the survey were 
paid $0.50.  
The survey was administered using the Qualtrics survey platform, with 
respondents randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. The full 
manipulation can be found in Appendix A. The full set of measures, and question order, 
can be found in Appendix B.  
632 responses were collected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk over a 24-hour 
period in April of 2014. Anyone who did not complete the survey, as indicated by 
Qualtrics, was removed from the data set (n = 31). Additionally, respondents were 
removed for providing nonsensical responses to open-ended questions (n = 1), and for a 
failure to answer the questions about party identification (n = 1). Finally, anyone more 
than two standard deviations away from the mean time taken to read the manipulation 
was removed from the sample (M = 74.9, SD = 85.09, number removed = 10), as were 
those who took less than ten seconds to read the manipulation (n = 53). The final number 
of eligible subjects was 530. 
14 
Manipulation 
Participants read a simulated online newspaper article describing a bill that would 
curtail the ability of the NSA to monitor the electronic activities of American citizens. 
The article was crafted to be as balanced as possible. It laid out the strongest arguments 
for and against the NSA program, as identified by the Pew Research Center (2013b).  
There were three versions of the article: (1) Control, (2) Republican and (3) 
Democrat. In the first paragraph of the article and in the article title, the party of the 
individuals proposing the bill was altered to fit one of the three conditions, and in the last 
paragraph, the partisan affiliation of the organization was altered to match the first 
partisan reference (e.g. “the Democratic Center for Policy Dialogue). A picture 
accompanied the article, depicting Democratic Senator Ron Wyden, Republican Senator 
Saxby Chambliss or the Senate Chambers, depending on the condition. These two 
senators were picked because they have expressed views consonant with those stated in 
the article. Each respondent had an equal probability of being assigned to the three 
conditions. There were no significant differences in the distribution of respondents across 
any of the independent/demographic variables.2 
Dependent Variables 
There were two dependent variables: attitudes toward the NSA surveillance 
program (NSA Attitudes) and attitudes toward the bill proposed to alter the program (Bill 
Attitudes). Both were measured using a set of semantic differentials. Respondents were 
presented with a randomly ordered set of polarized adjectives on a 7-point scale from -3 
2 See Appendix C for results of the between groups comparisons. 
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to 3. There were four sets of adjectives for each dependent variable, covering a range of 
possible attitudes. For NSA Attitudes, differentials included: (1) beneficial/harmful, (2) 
unreasonable/reasonable, (3) responsible/irresponsible and (4) necessary/unnecessary. 
The second and third were reverse coded. After data collection, all scores were averaged 
to create a single measure for NSA Attitudes, where lower scores indicate lower support 
for the NSA and higher scores indicate higher support for the NSA (α = .944, M = -1.1, 
SD = 1.74, Range = -3 to 3).  
For Bill attitudes, differentials included: (1) ignorant/intelligent, (2) 
unimportant/important, (3) good/bad, and (4) responsible/irresponsible. Item’s three and 
four were reverse coded. Originally, all four were averaged together into a single scale (α 
= .944, M = 1.6, SD = 1.43, Range = -3 to 3). However, because this scale failed Tukey’s 
Test for Nonadditivity (F (1, 1586) = 30.36, p < .001), the question about 
unimportance/importance was removed, and the dependent variable was recalculated 
based only on the other three items (α = .940, M = 1.5, SD = 1.49, Range = -3 to 3; 
Tukey’s Test for Nonadditivity: F (1, 1057) = 1.99, p = .158). All hypothesis tests were 
run both with the three-item scale, and with the original four-item scale. There were no 
significant differences in the results. As such, only the scores for the three-item scale are 
reported. 
Frequency of Political Discussion 
The frequency of discussion within a respondents political discussion network 
was measured following the methodology established by Mutz (2002a, 2002b). 
Respondents identified, by initials, the three individuals they discuss government, 
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elections and politics with the most.3 If, at any point, a respondent indicated there was no 
one else she discussed politics with, she was instead asked to identify the person with 
whom she was most likely to have an informal conversation. This was repeated until the 
respondent gave the initials of three individuals.  
If the initials reported for a discussant duplicated a prior set of initials, the 
corresponding responses (both frequency of political discussion and exposure to 
dissonant discussion) were removed from analysis. While it is feasible that an individual 
had more than one discussion partner with the same initials, knowing which discussant 
was being referred to would be difficult for the respondent, given the questionnaire 
format. If the response given was not a name, nor a reference to a person (e.g. “yes,” “no 
one,” “none,” etc.), the corresponding discussant was also removed. 
Using a 4-point scale (1 = Very Rarely, 4 = A Lot), respondents were asked to 
describe the frequency of political discussion with each of the named discussants. To 
create a political discussion frequency summary score, these measures were summed (α = 
.772, M = 4.5, SD = 3.48, Range = 0 to 12). For hypothesis testing, respondents were 
split into two groups at the median (high discussion group = Score > 5, N = 215; low 
discussion group N = 204). 
Exposure to Cross-Cutting Political Communication 
To measure exposure to cross-cutting political communication, respondents were 
asked five randomly ordered questions about each discussant’s views and party 
allegiances (Mutz, 2002b). These questions covered similarity of political views (from 0 
3 The original methodology from Mutz (2002a) calls for asking either for the initials of the discussant or for 
the first name. However, the IRB that reviewed this research determined that the risks associated with 
asking for the first name might have outweighed the benefits. 
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= much the same, to 2 = very different), similarity of views on political issues (0 for 
shares or neither shares nor opposes, 1 = opposes), general disagreement during 
discussion of politics (0 = never to 3 = often), political party favored (coded 1 if 
respondent only weakly supports opposite party of discussant, 2 if clear disagreement, 0 
if else), and presidential candidate supported during the 2014 election (coded 1 for clear 
disagreement with respondent, 0 for all others).  
Each of the measures were coded as described, transformed so all five measures 
ranged from 0 to 1, and summed to create a single additive index for each discussant, 
ranging from 0 to 5 (Discussant 1 α = .836, Discussant 2 α = .857, Discussant 3 α = .808; 
Grand Mean = 2.4, SD = 2.04, Grand Range = 0 to 11.17, Grand Theoretical Range = 0 
to 15). This “[represents the extent to which each discussion partner [holds] differing 
views [from the respondent]” (Mutz, 2002a, p. 123). To create a single cross-cutting 
communication exposure score, each index was weighted by its corresponding political 
discussion frequency, and then summed (M = 5.1, SD = 5.83, Range = 0 to 35.83; 
Theoretical Range = 0 to 60). For hypothesis testing, respondents were split into two 
groups at the median (high exposure group = score > 4.67, N = 206; low exposure group 
N = 213). Average levels of cross-cutting exposure were comparable to previous findings 
(See: Mutz, 2002a). 
Political Party and Partisan Strength 
For political party, respondents were first asked if, generally speaking, they think 
of themselves as Republican, Democrat or Independent. They also had the option of 
stating no preference. If the respondent was Independent or “no preference,” they were 
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asked whether they were closer to the Republican Party or Democratic Party. For H1c, 
‘strong partisans’ were conceptualized as anyone who originally reported being a party 
member (n = 288), with all others considered weak partisans (n = 242).  
Issue Specific Exposure to Cross-Cutting Political Communication 
As a control, respondents were asked whether they had discussed the NSA topic 
with each of the three discussants named. If discussed, they were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the discussant’s views (-3 = Strongly disagree, 3 = Strongly 
agree). Responses were weighted by amount of political discussion with the 
corresponding discussant, and combined into a single additive index (M = 4.5, SD = 7.02, 
Range = -13 to 36).  
Political and Issue Motivations 
Motivation is known to act as a moderator of media effects (Eveland, 2004). As 
such, four possible motivations were measured as controls. 
Issue exposure. As exposure to an issue increases through either conversation or 
media exposure, the motivation to accurately process the information increases 
(Druckman et al., 2013; Hopmann, Vliegenthart, De Vreese, & Albæk, 2010). With this 
in mind, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they had heard or read 
about the NSA issue on a 5-point scale (0 = None to 4 = A Lot; M = 2.6, SD = 1.02). 
Issue importance. The more personally important an individual finds a particular 
topic to be, the more motivated the individual is to accurately process the message 
(Miller & Peterson, 2004). As such, individuals were asked to report how important the 
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NSA topic was to them personally on a 7-point scale (0 = Very unimportant to 6 = Very 
important; M = 4.2, SD = 1.35). 
Interest. Political interest is also known to be a motivation that moderates media 
effects (Grabe, Yegiyan, & Kamhawi, 2008), and was measured by asking individuals 
how often they follow what is going on in the government and public affairs on a 5-point 
scale (0 = Never to 4 = Most of the Time; M = 2.9, SD = .98). Additionally, issue specific 
interest was measured by asking about the frequency with which respondents sought out 
information on the NSA in the last month, on a 7-point scale (0 = Never to 6 = Daily; M 
= 2.5, SD = 1.68).  
Political Knowledge 
Much like motivation, political knowledge is a well-established moderator of 
political media effects (Young, 2004). To control for this, Delli Carpini and Keeter’s 
(1993) well-established political knowledge scale was used. Five open-ended questions 
cover a range of possible political information relevant to knowledge about the federal 
government. Individuals were asked to identify the more conservative party, the party 
currently in control of the House of Representatives, who Joe Biden is, which branch of 
government is responsible for determining if a bill is constitutional, and the necessary 
proportion of Congress required to over-turn a presidential veto. Incorrect answers were 
scored as 0, and correct answers were scored as 1. Each response was summed to create a 
single political knowledge score (α = .550, M = 4.1, SD = 1.08, Range = 0 to 5).4 
4 The alpha for this test was significantly lower than is typical, primarily driven by the large number of 
respondents knowing four out of the five questions (27%), and knowing all of the questions (49.1%). 
Overall, the sample was much more capable of answering the questions than is typical. For example, Delli 
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Demographic Variables 
This study also included a range of standard demographic variables. Gender was 
coded as 1 for female, 0 for male. Education was coded as 1 for High School/GED or 
less; 2 for some college or a two-year college degree; 3 for a four-year college degree; 
and 4 for a post-graduate degree. Race was coded as 0 for white/Caucasian and 1 for all 
others. Respondents gave their actual age, ranging from 18 to 76. Income was coded in 
$25,000 intervals, from 1 to 5. 
Participant Demographics. All demographic information is provided in 
Appendix D. The sample skewed younger, with a median age of 31, and a mode of 26. 
There were more males in the sample than females, and respondents were 
overwhelmingly white. Most respondents did not initially state a party preference, 
although there were significantly more Democrats in the sample than there were 
Republicans. Appendix C has a full breakdown of all demographic statistics, along with 
breakdowns by condition seen, and results of statistical tests comparing each variable 
across condition. 
Analysis 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The first and second parts of hypothesis one predict 
differences in reported attitudes for individuals who saw dissonant cues, consonant cues, 
and no cue. Individuals who were in the same party (e.g. Republicans in the Republican 
condition) were placed in the consonant cue group. Similarly, individuals who saw the 
opposing party (e.g. Republicans in the Democrat condition) were placed in the dissonant 
Carpini and Keeter (1993), when developing this scale, found that 37% of all respondents knew the veto-
override threshold, compared to 67.3% of this sample.  
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cue group. Where these two hypothesis looked specifically at differences between 
conditions, the corresponding tests looked at raw scores for each of the dependent 
variables. For H1a, four one-tailed independent samples t-tests compared differences 
between the consonant group and the control, and differences between the dissonant 
group and the control. H1b used a pair of one-way ANOVA to compare differences 
between all three groups. 
Hypothesis 1c. The third part of hypothesis one predicts that strong partisans will 
be more affected by cues than weak partisans. Strong partisans were operationalized as 
individuals who originally reported being a party member, with all others considered 
weak partisans. Here, the prediction is not that there will be a difference in attitudes 
between groups, but rather that there will be an absolute difference in difference. In order 
to facilitate this comparison, the dependent variables were transformed as follows, where 
SP is strong partisans, and WP is weak partisans: |𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| |𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 −𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
The mean value of the strong partisans in the control condition was subtracted 
from the observed value for each respondent in a cue condition (no differentiation was 
made for which cue the participant saw, just that she saw a cue). The same was done for 
the weak partisans. The absolute value of these differences were then compared using a 
pair of one-tailed independent samples t-tests, with the average value for strong partisans 
predicted to be greater than that of weak partisans.  
Hypothesis 2. Similar to H1c, the second hypothesis predicts a difference in 
difference between individuals with high political discussion frequency and those with 
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low political discussion frequency. Individuals were only included in the analysis of this 
hypothesis if they reported speaking with at least one other individual about politics at 
any time in the past (n = 419). Respondents were split into two groups at the median, 
with those reporting a sum score greater than five getting placed in the ‘high discussion’ 
group, and all others getting placed in the ‘low discussion’ group.  
Where the prediction for H2 is for a difference in difference, the dependent 
variables were transformed as follows, where HD is high discussion, and LD is low 
discussion: |𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| |𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
The resultant scores were compared using a pair of one-tailed independent 
samples t-tests, with the average value for high discussion predicted to be greater than 
that for low discussion.  
Hypothesis 3. Similar to H1c and H2, the third hypothesis predicts a difference in 
difference between individuals with high exposure to cross-cutting political 
communication and those with low exposure to cross-cutting political communication. 
Respondents were split into two groups at the median; those with a score greater than 
4.67 were put in the ‘high exposure’ group, with all other placed in the ‘low exposure’ 
group. As with H2, only individuals who reported speaking with at least one other 
individual about politics were included within these groups. The dependent variables 
were transformed as follows, where LE is low exposure and HE is high exposure: |𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| |𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
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The resultant scores were compared using a pair of one-tailed independent 
samples t-tests, with the average value for ‘low exposure’ predicted to be greater than 





This analysis looks at differences in opposition to the NSA and support for 
limiting the NSA based upon each respondent’s party, partisan strength, political 
discussion frequency, cross-cutting political communication exposure and exposure to 
consonant or dissonant partisan cues. In general, respondents did not have a favorable 
view of the NSA; 69% of the sample had a negative NSA Attitude. Similarly, 81% had a 
positive Bill Attitude. As was expected, there was a very strong correlation between NSA 
Attitude and Bill Attitude, r (530) = -.629, p < .001. 
Hypothesis 1a 
H1a predicts that individuals who see a partisan cue will report attitudes aligning 
more closely with the position of their party than those who do not see a partisan cue. 
One-tailed independent samples t-tests were used to test this hypothesis, first comparing 
everyone who saw a consonant cue (e.g. Democrats who saw a Democrat cue) to 
everyone who saw no cue, and then comparing everyone who saw a dissonant cue (e.g. 
Democrats who saw a Republican cue) to everyone who saw no cue5.  
First, there was no difference (t (353) = .68, p = .249) in NSA Attitudes for those 
shown a consonant cue (N = 176, M = -.98, SD = 1.84) and those shown no cue (N = 
179, M = -1.10, SD = 1.71). Additionally, there was no difference (t (353) = .89, p = 
.188) in Bill Attitudes between those who saw a consonant cue (M = 1.49, SD 1.52) and 
those who saw no cue (M = 1.62, SD = 1.40). 
5 Looking at specific political parties did not significantly alter the results of these tests.  
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Similarly, there was no difference (t (352) = .20, p = .422) in NSA Attitudes for 
those shown a dissonant cue (N = 175, M = -1.14, SD = 1.69) and those not shown a cue 
(N = 179, M = -1.10, SD = 1.70). There was also no difference (t (352) = .77, p = .222) in 
Bill Attitudes for those shown a dissonant cue (M = 1.50, SD = 1.56) and those not shown 
a cue (M = 1.62, SD = 1.40). H1a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 1b 
Hypothesis 1b predicts that those shown a dissonant cue will have attitudes more 
strongly in line with their party (higher scores for NSA Attitude and lower scores for Bill 
Attitude) than those shown a consonant cue. Two one-way ANOVA were used to test for 
differences between the consonant, dissonant, and no cue groups. The results were 
confirmed using a set of one-tailed independent samples t-tests. 
Scores for NSA Opposition did not differ significantly between the three groups, 
F (2, 527) = .42, p = .328. Similarly, scores for NSA Limiting did not differ significantly 
between the three groups, F (2, 527) = .45, p = .320. Hypothesis 1b was not supported. 
Hypothesis 1c 
H1c predicts that the difference in attitudes between the no cue and the cue 
conditions will be greater for strong partisans than for weak partisans. Following the 
transformations described in the data analysis sub-section of the methods, this hypothesis 
can be re-written as: 
�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� > |𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 −𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
A pair of one-tailed independent samples t-tests compared the difference in 
absolute difference for strong partisans (SP) who saw a cue and weak partisans (WP) who 
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saw a cue. Because tests for both NSA Attitudes and Bill Attitudes failed the Levene’s 
Test for Equality of Variances (F = 5.03, p = .026; and F = 8.39, p = .004 respectively), 
the Welch-Satterthwaite t-test was used, rather than the standard Student’s t-test.  
Table 1 –Attitudes by Strong or Weak Partisanship 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NSA Attitudes  
Control Condition 
Strong Partisan 107 -0.95 1.79 .173 
Weak Partisan 72 -1.33 1.56 .183 
NSA Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
Strong Partisan 181 -0.72 1.84 .136 
Weak Partisan 170 -1.41 1.62 .124 
Bill Attitudes 
Control Condition 
Strong Partisan 107 1.59 1.44 .140 
Weak Partisan 72 1.67 1.34 .157 
Bill Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
Strong Partisan 181 1.22 1.62 .121 
Weak Partisan 170 1.78 1.38 .107 
 
First, the average absolute difference in NSA Attitudes between the control 
condition and the cue conditions was significantly greater for strong partisans (M = 1.58, 
SD = .96) than for weak partisans (M = 1.37, SD = .85), t (348.0) = 2.12, p = .017, MD = 
.205. Conversely, the average absolute difference in Bill Attitudes between the control 
condition and the cue conditions was not significantly greater for strong partisans (M = 
1.31, SD = 1.17) than for weak partisans (M = 1.17, SD = .75)6, t (330.8) = 1.45, p = 
.069, MD = .138. Where there was a difference on the first dependent variable, but not 
the second, H1c was only partially supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the difference in attitudes between the no cue and the 
cue conditions will be greater for those with high political discussion frequency than for 
6 Because the dependent variable in this test was not normally distributed, an independent samples Mann-
Whitney U test was performed, for verification. The results of the test were also non-significant, p = .064.  
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those with low political discussion frequency. Similar to H1c, and following the 
transformation described in the sub-section on data analysis, this hypothesis can be re-
written as: 
�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� > |𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
A pair of one-tailed independent samples t-tests compared the difference in 
absolute difference between those with high discussion who saw a cue (HD) and those 
with low discussion who saw a cue (LD).  
Table 2 –Attitudes by High or Low Political Discussion Frequency 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NSA Attitudes  
Control Condition 
High Discussion 69 -1.34 1.67 .201 
Low Discussion 73 -0.87 1.73 .202 
NSA Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
High Discussion 146 -1.22 1.84 .152 
Low Discussion 131 -0.87 1.67 .146 
Bill Attitudes 
Control Condition 
High Discussion 69 2.01 1.14 .138 
Low Discussion 73 1.44 1.49 .174 
Bill Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
High Discussion 146 1.79 1.44 .119 
Low Discussion 131 1.33 1.50 .131 
 
First, the average absolute difference in NSA Attitudes between the control 
condition and the cue conditions for high discussion (M = 1.54, SD = 1.00) and low 
discussion (M = 1.43, SD = .86) did not significantly differ, t (275) = .97, p = .168, MD = 
.109. Similarly, there was not a significant difference on absolute difference in Bill 
Attitudes between high discussion (M = 1.09, SD = .97) and low discussion7 (M = 1.21, 
SD = .88), t (275) = -1.14, p = .128, MD = -.127. Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
7 Where the dependent variable in this test was not normally distributed, an independent samples Mann-
Whitney U test was also performed. The results of the test were non-significant, p = .104 
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Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the difference in attitudes between the no cue and the 
cue conditions will be smaller for those with high exposure to cross-cutting political 
communication than for those with low exposure to cross-cutting political 
communication. Similar to H1c and H2, and following the transformation described in 
the sub-section on data analysis, this hypothesis can be re-written as: 
�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� > |𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐| 
A pair of one-tailed independent samples t-tests compared the difference in 
absolute difference between low exposure who saw a cue (LE) and high exposure who 
saw a cue (HE).  
Table 3 – Attitudes by Low or High Exposure to Cross-Cutting Communication 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NSA Attitudes  
Control Condition 
Low Exposure 73 -0.88 1.64 .192 
High Exposure 69 -1.33 1.76 .212 
NSA Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
Low Exposure 140 -0.94 1.76 .149 
High Exposure 137 -1.18 1.77 .151 
Bill Attitudes 
Control Condition 
Low Exposure 73 1.52 1.44 .168 
High Exposure 69 1.93 1.24 .150 
Bill Attitudes  
Cue Conditions 
Low Exposure 140 1.40 1.58 .133 
High Exposure 137 1.75 1.37 .117 
 
First, there was not a significant difference in absolute differences on NSA 
Attitudes for low exposure (M = 1.49, SD = .92) and high exposure (M = 1.50, SD = .95), 
t (275) = -.04, p = .486, MD = -.004. However, there was a significant difference in 
absolute Bill Attitude differences between low exposure (M = 1.28, SD = .93) and high 
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exposure8 (M = 1.07, SD = .86), t (275) = 1.91, p = .029. The average absolute difference 
between the cue conditions and the no cue condition was .204 points greater for those 
with low exposure to cross-cutting communication than those with high exposure to 
cross-cutting communication. H3 was partially supported. 
  
8 Where the dependent variable in this test was not normally distributed, an independent samples Mann-
Whitney U test was also performed. The results of this test were significant, p = .012. 
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Discussion 
This experiment looked at the effect of partisan cues on attitudes toward the NSA, 
as predicted by the theory of motivated reasoning. While there was no main effect from 
the manipulation, strong partisans were significantly more affected by the presence of 
partisan cues than weak partisans, when looking at NSA Attitudes. Because most prior 
research is focused on issues that already have entrenched partisan positions, these 
findings are an important extension. The results confirm that partisan cues have an effect 
on attitudes, even when the issue being considered is not inherently partisan. However, 
the specific ways in which partisan cues have an effect on an issue of this nature may 
differ. 
This study also aimed to expand our knowledge of partisan cue effects by looking 
at the moderating role of political discussion frequency in general, and cross-cutting 
communication exposure specifically. While there was no difference between those with 
high political discussion frequency and those with low political discussion frequency, 
there was a difference based on cross-cutting political communication exposure, when 
looking at Bill Attitudes. This is an important extension both to the partisan cue literature, 
and to our understanding of political communication networks. The results indicate that 
an individual’s conversation network, and more specifically, what kinds of conversations 




Before discussing implications, it is important to understand the limitations to this 
study. First, the sample was far from representative. This is an inherent issue with the 
sampling technique used (i.e. convenience sampling), and presents concerns when trying 
to make generalizations based upon the presented results. The highly skewed sample 
exacerbates this concern. 79.6% of the respondents felt that the NSA was an important 
issue, indicating they were highly motivated to accurately process the article. In other 
words, the sample collected may have been impervious to the manipulation, and/or 
unusually affected by it. 
Second, the use of initials, and not initials and/or first names, presented a 
significant challenge to this research.9 Because of the possibility that an individual could 
have more than one discussant with the same initials (e.g. brothers and sisters), and given 
the inability to differentiate between referents when asking about the cross-cutting nature 
of said discussion, it was necessary to remove responses based upon duplicate entries. 
While there was not a significant difference with or without these added variables, it is 
possible that a more robust testing mechanism would have presented different, more 
reliable results. 
Third, it is especially worth noting that prior to this study being conducted, there 
was significant movement on the NSA issue. Less than a month before this experiment 
took place, President Obama proposed changes to the NSA that in many ways directly 
echoed the proposals in the manipulation (Rampton, 2014). This increased attention 
9 Again, it should be noted that this break from the work of Mutz (2002a, 2002b) was based upon feedback 
from the IRB reviewing the methodology. 
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shortly before the launch of the study may have skewed the results. In relation to this, 
there were some rather odd fluctuations in the dependent variables, especially across 
party affiliation and strength. While no explanation was found within the collected data, 
it is possible that the timing of the study was responsible (although I believe an 
alternative explanation to be more likely, as will be discussed shortly). Follow up studies 
should be performed on a more representative sample. 
Finally, and perhaps especially relevant given the sampling methodology, this 
study suffered from a lack of stimuli checks. While many of the variables were 
randomized and reverse coded in order to limit the impact of inattentive responses, a 
stimulus check would have allowed for a systematic removal of cases where it was clear 
that individuals had not taken the study seriously (Mutz, 2011). This would have 
provided for a more valid sample. 
Implications 
Despite the limitations of this study, there are a number of important implications 
hinted to by the results. One of these implications is that the issue under consideration 
may have a different influence on partisan cue effects than was previously known. 
Despite the partisan cue in this study having no main effect on respondents, there were 
still significant differences across partisan strength and across different levels of cross-
cutting communication exposure. The partisan cue had an effect, but not necessarily in 
the ways predicted by the theory of partisan motivated reasoning.  
While the increased attention to this issue prior to the study may be responsible 
for the counter-theoretical results, there is an alternative explanation: the unique nature of 
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the NSA scandal. The NSA data collection issue is highly controversial, and yet it shares 
both bi-partisan support and bi-partisan opposition. An example of how the 
characteristics of this may have resulted in theoretically unaccounted for effects concerns 
the way in which strong partisans were affected by the partisan cue. Strong partisans 
seeing a dissonant cue and strong partisans seeing a consonant cue both showed a 
difference from the control condition, but the difference was in the same direction. 
Specifically, strong partisans who saw either cue had significantly lower Bill Attitudes 
than strong partisans who did not see a cue, t (286) = 1.93, p = .027. It did not matter 
which cue it was, the response was roughly the same. 
This may be due to the lack of an explicit sponsor for the bill under consideration, 
and again, the unique characteristics of this issue. As noted previously, the leaders of 
both the Democratic and Republican Party – including Democratic Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid and Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner – have supported 
allowing the NSA to continue as is. Where the ‘party elites’ have made their views 
known, it is possible that some of the most partisan respondents were reacting to elected 
officials perceived as unfaithful to their party (i.e. those proposing the bill from within 
their own party, despite the stances of senior party officials). This would certainly explain 
the counter-theoretical results, but is impossible to confirm with the collected data. If 
future testing can reproduce a similar effect, it would suggest that an expansion to the 
theory of motivated reasoning might be necessary. 
A second implication of these results concerns differences in partisan cue effect 
moderators for varying kinds of attitudes. Here, it is worth recalling that partisan strength 
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had a different effect on the relationship between partisan cues and attitudes than cross-
cutting political communication exposure did. The strength of an individual’s partisan 
affiliation altered the relationship between partisan cues and NSA Attitudes, whereas 
cross-cutting political communication exposure altered the relationship between partisan 
cues and Bill Attitudes. The expectation was that these moderators would influence both 
dependent variable measures equally; the question then, is why they did not. 
The clear explanation for these split results seems to be the nature of the variables 
themselves. Where the question for NSA Attitudes seems rather clearly to capture 
attitudes toward an existing issue, the question for Bill Attitudes on its face seems to 
measure attitudes toward a future solution to the issue. In context, believing the NSA’s 
data-collection activities are bad does not imply a belief that the Senate is capable of 
effectively fixing the problem in the future. The split effects for these two measures 
suggest that partisan cues may not have a universal effect on all attitudes. As such, it is 
important to continue exploring the underlying cognitive structures mediating the partisan 
cue effect, and the corresponding implications.   
Among the more important theoretical implications, this study points toward the 
possibility that cross-cutting networks influence the way individual’s process political 
messages, and do so in a way not fully accounted for by, but complementary to, the 
theory of motivated reasoning. This could have profound implications for 
Communication, Psychology and Political Science research writ large. The next step in 
this research line is to explore the effect of cross-cutting exposure on the cognitive 
processing strategy used when reading/viewing political messages. 
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Conclusion 
In summation, it is worth considering the normative implications of this study, 
specifically in relation to cross-cutting exposure and partisan strength. Strong partisans 
tend to be the most politically knowledgeable, and the most politically active individuals 
in America. Strong partisans are the individuals most actively shaping the American 
government, by consistently showing up at the ballot box, making their views known to 
their representatives and by reaching out to consonant others to do the same. Most 
unfortunately, strong partisans are also the most likely to have their attitudes altered by 
partisan cues.  
If the role of political communication research is to assist in the promotion of 
“civic competence and coherent voting behavior” (Druckman et al., 2013, p. 75), than 
these findings may help to reinforce the normative standard of the ideal citizen, as one 
willing to participate in deliberation with dissonant others. The findings from this study 
suggest that consistent exposure to opposing views may help to decrease the power of 
partisan cues to trump logic and argument strength when making political relevant 
decisions.   
Scheufele (2002) and Mutz make similar arguments: “homogeneous environments 
are ideal for purposes of encouraging political mobilization… heterogeneity makes these 
same activities much harder” (Mutz, 2002b, p. 852). It is perhaps then unsurprising that 
strong partisans are the least likely to have a heterogeneous communication network. 
While it is harder to mobilize an individual constantly exposed to dissonant views than it 
is to mobilize someone who only hears what they want to hear, this research indicates 
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that dissonance shapes a more nuanced view of the world. This nuance may be exactly 
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Appendix A – Stimuli 
We would now like to have you read a news story about this topic which was published recently 
by the Associated Press. Please read it completely before moving on to the next section. 
Bill Proposed [by Senate -- Democrats / 
Republicans] To End NSA Data Collection 
PICTURE GOES HERE 
WASHINGTON (AP) - While Americans remain sharply divided on the NSA’s 
public surveillance of most U.S. phone calls and emails, a new bill is being 
proposed [by a group of Senate -- Democrats / Republicans] that would curtail 
the program. The NSA program has been characterized by supporters of the bill 
as a violation of personal privacy and the 4th Amendment’s protection against 
unlawful search.   
With court approval, the government has been collecting data from nearly all 
phone calls and email communications in the U.S. This data includes things like 
date, time, phone numbers, email address and other meta-information. Recently 
made changes to the surveillance program have placed restrictions on how the 
data is collected, such as requiring all activities to be monitored by a full-time 
civil liberties officer.    
Opponents argue that any further changes will limit the ability of the NSA to 
identify future national security threats. They believe that the data provided by 
the program is an important tool in the fight against terrorism.   
Supporters of the new bill argue that those changes do not go far enough to 
protect Americans and that more should be done. They would like to see 
additional changes such as prohibiting bulk collection, and only allowing records 
that are to or from a suspect to be gathered, rather than those that are simply 
about the target.    
“Social media and other online communities have provided a safe haven for 
having open and private dialog with individuals across the globe,” said William 
Murphy, president of the [Democratic / Republican] Center for Policy Dialogue. 
“This bill will generally prevent the government from listening to those 
conversations.” 
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Picture 1 – Control 
 
Picture 2 - Democrat
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Appendix B – Survey Measures 
Q1 – Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. How often 
would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs? 
Most of the Time 
Some of the Time 
Only Now and Then 
Hardly at All 
Never 
Q2 – As you may know, it has recently been revealed that the NSA (National Security Agency) 
has been collecting meta-data on almost all communications in the U.S. How much have 
you heard or read about this topic? 
None - Only a little - Some - Quite a bit - A Lot 
Q3 – How unimportant or important would you say this topic is to you personally? 
Not at all Important – Very Unimportant – Somewhat Unimportant – Neither 
Unimportant nor Important – Somewhat Important – Very Important – Extremely 
Important 
Q4 – In the last month, how frequently have you sought out information about this topic? 
Never – Less than Once a Month – Once a Month – 2-3 Times a Month – Once a 
Week – 2-3 Times a Week – Daily 
[Question Timer] 
[Instruct 2 (see Appendix A)] 
[Show Manipulation (see Appendix A)] 
[Question Timer] 
[Randomize Question Order – Also Randomize Item Order] 
Q5 – Collecting meta-data from nearly all American communication as part of anti-terrorism 
efforts is: 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  
Harmful ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Beneficial 
Unreasonable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Reasonable 
Necessary ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Unnecessary 
Acceptable ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Unacceptable 
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Q6 – Passing a bill limiting the ability of the National Security Agency to collect information about 
the communications of American citizens is: 
 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  
Unimportant ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Important 
Ignorant ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Intelligent 
Responsible ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Irresponsible 
Good ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ Bad 
 [End Randomize Question Order] 




[End Randomize order] 
Independent 
No preference 
D2a – Would you call yourself a… 
[Randomize order] 
Strong Democrat 
Not very strong Democrat 
[End Randomize order] 
D2b – Would you call yourself a… 
[Randomize order] 
Strong Republican 
Not very strong Republican 
[End Randomize order] 




[End Randomize order] 









Instruct 3 – From time to time, people discuss government, elections, and politics with other 
people. We'd like you to provide the first names or just the initials of people you talk with 
about these matters. These people might be from your family, from work, from the 
neighborhood, from some other organization you belong to, or they might be from 
somewhere else. These discussions could have happened in person, on the phone, in an 
online chat room, on social media, or somewhere else. 
Q7 – Who is the person you’ve talked with most about politics? (Please give the initials only) 
Initials 
 [Allow Text Entry] 
I do not speak about politics with anyone 
 [If selected skip to Q7a, followed by Q8a, and Q9a] 
Q8 – Aside from the person you just named, who is the person you’ve talked with most about 
politics? 
Initials 
 [Allow Text Entry] 
There is no one else I discuss politics with 
 [If selected skip to Q7a, followed by Q8a] 
Q9 – Aside from the two individuals you have named so far, is there someone else you’ve talked 
with about politics? 
Initials 
 [Allow Text Entry] 
There is no one else I discuss politics with 
 [If selected skip to Q7a] 
Q7a – Well then, can you give the initials of the person with whom you were most likely to have 
informal conversations with during the course of the past month? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q8a – Aside from the person you just named, who is the person you were most likely to have 
informal conversations with during the course of the past few months? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q9a – Aside from the two individuals you have named so far, who is the person you were most 
likely to have informal conversations with during the course of the past few months? 
[Allow Text Entry] 







[Randomize order of questions] 
Q11 – Compared with [insert name], would you say that your political views are much the same, 
somewhat different, or very different? 
Much the same 
Somewhat Different 
Very Different 
Q12 – Do you think [insert name] normally favors Republicans or Democrats, or both, or neither? 






Q13 – Which presidential candidate, if any, did [insert name] favor in the last election? Obama, 




[End randomize order] 
Other 
Don’t Know 






Q15 – Overall, do you feel [insert name] shares most of your views on political issues, opposes 
them, or doesn’t [insert name] do either one? 
Shares 
Neither shares nor opposes 
Opposes 
[End Randomization] 
Q16 – Have you discussed the NSA surveillance program with [insert name]? 
Yes 
No 
[If Yes, show Q16a] 
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Q16a – Do you agree or disagree with [insert name]’s views on this topic? 
Strongly Disagree – Disagree – Somewhat Disagree – Neither Disagree nor Agree – 
Somewhat Agree – Agree – Strongly Agree 
[Repeat Q10-Q16a x 2] 
Instruct 4 - We're now going to ask you a few questions about the government in Washington. 
Please write your responses in the space provided directly below each question. Many 
people don't know the answers to these questions, so if there are some you don't know just 
write that and move on. 
[Randomize Order of Questions] 
Q17 – What job or political office is now held by Joe Biden? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q18 – Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not … is it the president, 
the Congress, or the Supreme Court? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q19 – How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a 
presidential veto? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q20 – Which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington right 
now? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
Q21 – Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other, and if so which 
one? 
[Allow Text Entry] 
[End Randomization] 
Instruct 5 – The following questions are for demographic purposes. Please answer as accurately 
as possible. Your responses will remain confidential. 
D4 – What is your current age? 
[Allow Text Entry] 






D6 – What is your race / ethnicity 
{Drop down list} 
White / Caucasian – African American – Hispanic – Asian – Native American – 
Pacific Islander – Other 
D7 – What is your annual salary (including bonuses and commissions in U.S. dollars? 
{Drop down list} 
0-$25,000 - $25,001-$50,000 - $50,001-$75,000 - $75,001-$100,000 - $100,001-
$125,000 - $125,001-$150,000 - $150,001-$175,000 - $175,001-$200,000 - 
$200,001+ - Prefer not to state 
D8 – What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
{Drop down list} 
Less than High School – High School / GED – Some College – 2-year College 
Degree – 4-year College Degree – Master’s Degree – Doctoral Degree – 
Professional Degree (JD, MD) – Prefer not to state 
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Appendix C – Demographic Statistics and Tests for Between Condition Differences 
Interval/Ratio Level Variables by Condition Seen 
Variable Condition N Mean SD Min. Max. 
DV - NSA Attitudes 
Control Condition 179 -1.1 1.7 -3 3 
Republican Condition 177 -1.1 1.7 -3 3 
Democrat Condition 174 -1.0 1.8 -3 3 
Total 530 -1.1 1.7 -3 3 
DV - Bill Attitudes 
Control Condition 179 1.6 1.4 -3 3 
Republican Condition 177 1.4 1.5 -3 3 
Democrat Condition 174 1.6 1.6 -3 3 
Total 530 1.5 1.5 -3 3 
Age 
Control Condition 179 33.7 12.7 18 74 
Republican Condition 177 35.2 12.3 19 76 
Democrat Condition 174 35.9 13.6 19 73 
Total 530 34.9 12.9 18 76 
Political Interest 
Control Condition 179 2.8 1.0 1 4 
Republican Condition 177 2.9 0.9 0 4 
Democrat Condition 174 2.9 1.0 0 4 
Total 530 2.9 1.0 0 4 
Issue Exposure 
Control Condition 179 2.6 1.1 0 4 
Republican Condition 177 2.6 1.0 0 4 
Democrat Condition 174 2.6 1.0 0 4 
Total 530 2.6 1.0 0 4 
Issue Importance 
Control Condition 179 4.2 1.3 0 6 
Republican Condition 177 4.3 1.3 0 6 
Democrat Condition 174 4.2 1.4 0 6 
Total 530 4.2 1.3 0 6 
Issue Interest 
Control Condition 179 2.3 1.7 0 5 
Republican Condition 177 2.5 1.6 0 6 
Democrat Condition 174 2.6 1.7 0 6 
Total 530 2.5 1.7 0 6 
Political Knowledge 
Control Condition 179 4.0 1.2 0 5 
Republican Condition 177 4.2 0.9 1 5 
Democrat Condition 174 4.1 1.2 0 5 
Total 530 4.1 1.1 0 5 
Political Discussion 
Frequency 
Control Condition 179 4.4 3.4 0 12 
Republican Condition 177 4.2 3.4 0 12 
Democrat Condition 174 5.0 3.6 0 12 
Total 530 4.5 3.5 0 12 
Cross-Cutting Exposure 
Control Condition 179 5.0 5.6 0 25 
Republican Condition 177 4.4 5.6 0 35 
Democrat Condition 174 5.7 6.3 0 36 
Total 530 5.1 5.8 0 36 
Issue Discussion (with 
valence) 
Control Condition 179 3.9 6.3 -13 30 
Republican Condition 177 4.3 6.7 -4 36 
Democrat Condition 174 5.3 7.9 -8 36 
Total 530 4.5 7.0 -13 36 
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ANOVA Tests – Interval/Ratio Variables by Condition Seen 
Variable Tested F-statistic Sig. (2-sided) 
DV – NSA Attitudes 0.21 .813 
DV – Bill Attitudes 0.69 .500 
Age 1.33 .264 
Political Interest 0.85 .426 
Issue Exposure 0.04 .958 
Issue Importance 0.24 .790 
Issue Interest 1.07 .346 
Political Knowledge 0.95 .388 
Political Discussion Frequency 2.75 .065 
Cross-Cutting Exposure 1.70 .184 
Issue Discussion (with Valence) 1.85 .158 
 
Nominal/Ordinal Level Variables by Condition Seen 
Variable Level Control Rep. Dem. Total % 
Partisan Strength 
Weak Partisan 72 89 81 242 45.7 
Strong Partisan 107 88 93 288 54.3 
Political Party 
Democrat 131 121 120 372 70.2 
Republican 48 56 54 158 29.8 
Gender 
Male 102 107 100 309 58.3 
Female 77 70 74 221 41.7 
Race 
White 142 139 137 418 78.9 
Other 37 38 37 112 21.1 
Education 
No College 27 21 17 65 12.3 
Some College 68 73 66 207 39.1 
4-Year College Degree 62 62 71 195 36.8 
Post-Graduate Degree 22 21 20 63 11.9 
Income 
$0 - $25,000 83 81 72 236 44.5 
$25,001 - $50,000 60 51 56 167 31.5 
$50,001 - $75,000 21 23 29 73 13.8 
$75,001 - $100,000 6 14 8 28 5.3 
$100,001 + 9 8 9 26 4.9 
 
Chi-Square Tests - Nominal/Ordinal Variables by Condition Seen 
Variable Tested Pearson χ2 df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Partisan Strength 3.71 2 .156 
Political Party 1.18 2 .556 
Gender 0.51 2 .773 
Race 0.04 2 .982 
Education 3.58 6 .734 
Income 6.74 8 .565 
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Appendix D – Informed Consent 
Informed Consent 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Benjamin Smith under the 
direction of Dr. Shaker. This study attempts to collect information about the public's familiarity 
with current events. 
Procedures 
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete the following questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes or less.  
Risks/Discomforts 
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel uncomfortable when 
asked to share information about yourself. You are welcome to skip any question that you feel 
uncomfortable answering. 
Benefits 
You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study. However, it is hoped that 
through your participation, the study may help to increase knowledge which may help others in 
the future. 
Confidentiality 
All information that is obtained in connection with this study will be kept confidential and will only 
be reported in an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and never reporting 
individual ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other than the research team 
will have access to them. At no point will your name be linked to your answers. 
Compensation 
Through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk, you will receive direct financial compensation for the 
completion of this survey in the sum of $.50 
Participation 
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any 
time or refuse to participate entirely. 
Questions about the Research 
If you have questions or concerns regarding this study, contact Benjamin Smith at 
bensmith@pdx.edu or Dr. Shaker at lshaker@pdx.edu. 
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants 
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If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, please contact 
Research and Strategic Partnerships, Market Center Building 6th floor, Portland State University, 
503-725-4288.  
By completing this survey, you are certifying that you are 18 years of age or older, an American 
citizen, that you have read and understand the above information and agree to take part in the 
survey. Press the "Print" button below to keep a copy of this form for your own records. 
If at this point you choose to continue in this research study, please click ">>>" to continue. 
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Appendix E – Institutional Review Board Human Subjects Approval 
Date: April 18, 2014 
 
To: Lee Shaker, Benjamin Smith 
From: Karen Cellarius, HSRRC Chair 
  
Re: HSRRC approval for your project titled, “Cross-Cutting Concerns:  The Varying 
Effects of Partisan Cues in the Context of Social Networks” 
 HSRRC Proposal # 143007 
 
Approval-Expiration: April 18, 2014-April 17, 2015 
 
Review Type: Expedited, Categories 7 
 
In accordance with your request, the PSU Human Subjects Research Review Committee 
has reviewed your request for approval of the project referenced above for compliance 
with PSU and DHHS policies and regulations covering the protection of human subjects.  
The Committee is satisfied that your provisions for protecting the rights and welfare of all 
subjects participating in the research are adequate, and your project is approved.  Please 
note the following requirements: 
 
Approval: You are approved to conduct this research study only during the period of 
approval cited above; and the research must be conducted according to the plans and 
protocol submitted (approved copy enclosed). 
 
Changes to Protocol:  Any changes in the proposed study, whether to procedures, 
survey instruments, consent forms or cover letters, must be outlined and submitted to the 
Committee immediately.  The proposed changes cannot be implemented before they have 
been reviewed and approved by the Committee. 
 
Continuing Review:  This approval will expire on.  It is the investigator’s responsibility 
to ensure that a Continuing Review Report on the status of the project is submitted to the 
HSRRC two months before the expiration date, and that approval of the study is kept 
current.  The Continuing Review Report is available at 
www.rsp.pdx.edu/compliance_human.php and in the Office of Research and Strategic 
Partnerships (RSP). 
 
Adverse Reactions and/or Unanticipated Problems:  If any adverse reactions or 
unanticipated problems occur as a result of this study, you are required to notify the 
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Committee immediately.  If the issue is serious, approval may be withdrawn pending an 
investigation by the Committee. 
 
Completion of Study:  Please notify the Committee as soon as your research has been 
completed.  Study records, including protocols and signed consent forms for each 
participant, must be kept by the investigator in a secure location for three years following 
completion of the study (or per any requirements specified by the project’s funding 
agency). 
 
If you have questions or concerns, please contact the Office of Research Integrity in the 
PSU RSP at hsrrc@pdx.edu. 
 
